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APPALLANT, PETITION'S THE COURT FOR A REHEARING, PURSUANT TO
RULE 35, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, TAYLOR HAS GOOD
REASON TO BELEIVE THAT THE COURT'S HAVE BOTH OVERLOOKED FACTS,
WHICH ANY ONE OF WHICH COULD HAVE CHANGED THE DISPOSITION OF
THIS CASE, TOGETHER WITH POINTS OF LAW, WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN
FULLY ADDRESSED BY THE APPLLATE COURT, INCLUDING THE AFFECTS
WHICH WILL BE FELT BY OTHER CONSUMERS UNDER LIKE CONDITIONS,
WHO ARE SUBJECTED TO DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, BY EQUIPMENT
SALESMEN, WHO RELY ONLY UPON THE WRITTEN CONTRACT. IN THIS CASE
YATES VS TAYLOR, THE COURT SAID "TAYLOR BREACHED THE AGREEMENT".
ITS TRUE TAYLOR RETURNED THE EXCAVATOR TO YATES, WHERE YATES
RE SOLD THE MACHINE, FOR MORE MONEY THAN HE HAD SOLD THE EXCAVATOR TO TAYLOR FOR. THE COURT SAW TO IT TAYLOR RECEIVED THE OVERAGE
AMOUNT, BUT CHARGED TAYLOR CWRONGFULLY3 FOR YATES'ES IMPOROPERLY
CLAIMED REPAIRS, WHICH YATES CLAIMED WERE AS A RESULT OF DAMAGES
YATES CLAIMED WERE CASUSED WHILE THE MACHINE WAS IN TAYLORS
CUSTODY. THE COURT'S HAVE OVERLOOKED EVIDENSE WHICH PROVES
BEYOND A DOUBT, THAT TAYLOR [DID NOT3 CAUSE CANY3 DAMAGE TO THE
EXCAVATOR AT ALL, BUT THAT TAYLOR ACTUALLY RETURNED THE EXCAVATOR
IN BETTER CONDITION, AND IT IS TAYLOR THAT SHOULD BE PAID FOR HIS
COSTS OF REPAIRS, NOT YATES. YATES MISREPRESENTED TO TAYLOR THE
CONDITION OF THE EXCAVATOR. TAYLOR DID NOT RENEGOCIATE THE SALE,
BUT MERELY "CORRECTED YATES MISTAKE'S". AND RETURNED THE EXCAVATOR.
FACT ONE
The court [did not] take into consideration the sub zero weather
in Lehi, and that the six hours spent by Taylor [was not3 spent
in looking the excavator over but starting a cold deisel engine.

page £
Fact two
The purchase agreement

left by Yates ar\d signed by Taylor

on January 8, 1390, was for the sum of C Two Thousand two hundred
dollars] . (see exhibit 37 C enclosed) Taylor could have left
Yates a check on January 8, 1990 for, C$ £,£00.003
c a v a t o r i n question.

ar\d owned the

Fact three
Taylor

called

Yates

attention

Taylor was at Century Equipment Company-

to

Yates

mistake while

Yates Crushed] to

meet Taylor at Century Equipment for the sole purpose of
[correctingD, not re-negeoting, the agreement, as the court
concluded was the reason Yates meeting Taylor at Century,
(see Trial record

page 6 line's 11 thru £5)
Fact four

Repetedly, Yates admitted

while under oath, Yates

had told Taylor, prior to the sale, prior to Taylor removing
the excavator from Yates equipment yard,that the excavator
was [ In Good Condition 3

« ( see Trial Record pages, 1£0

line's ££,£3,£4; Paxge 1£1 line's £,3,4,; Page 189 line's
10,11,12;)
Argument
In the case of the four facts presented Yates implied a warranty,
that the excavator was in [good condition] Taylor wanted art
excavator to excavate, not to look at. Taylor beleived Yates,
a respected equipment dealer. Had Taylor left a check for
2-

Page 3
the $ 2,200-00 on January 8, 1990 pursuant to the agreement
reduced to writing by Yates, as that sales agreement does
state, Taylor could have taken advantage of Yates. Taylor
however Cdid not entertain that ideal at all, but Taylor
called Yates attention to Yates mistake. Yates intentionally
told Taylor that the excavator was in

Cvery good condition] or

Cgood condition] This proved to be a total

misrepresentation

of fact. Taylor relied in Yates Judgement. Yates and Taylor
had done business before. Yates is an expert, and has been
recommending, and selling, used construction equipment for
years,

(see Trial Record page S3, line's 20 thru 25) The

law simply does not condone misrepresentation and states in
ftmJur 17ft 2d, 299,

[Stipulations excluding extraneous represent-

ations constituting or showing fraud],

(see page 27, of Taylors

brief, and note three additional law references are

given,

Un i form Commerc i a 1 Code 70ft~2-~602 (1) , Urc i form Consumers Sa 1 es
practice act, and Uniform Deceptive Sales Practices Plct. ftll
conclude that the acts are to protect the consumer from
suppliers who engage in deceptive sales practices, who represent
that goods or services are

of a particular quality and grade.

Yes, its true Yates admits he told Taylor that excavator

Cwas

in good condition] The court should not reward Yates for
such

mistatement

of

fact.

Yates

admitted

where

he

machine, and that he painted the machine . ( t o make the
machine look better)
page 3

got the

Page 4
Fact Five
The trial Court allowed for offsets, and damages Yates Claimed
Taylor Cdid to the excavator1 while the excavator was in Taylors
possession.
the

other's

The exclusionary Rule was imposed. No wittness heard
testimony,

yet

Make

Young

Testified

that

the

excavator cab was not bolted down upon the excavators arrival
on the job site January S, 1990. ( see Traal Record page 151,
line's £1,IE:3) . Further that the machine had oil leaks, arid

that

two barrel Is pf oil were put in it CilO gallons] which is totally
excessive for 5 or

G hours

operation.

<

see Trial

Record page

151, Line £ 5 ) . That oil consumption amounts to 18 galloms per
hour, at a price of $ 7.00 per gallon, or $ iclS. 00 per hour for
oil consumption alone, absolutely unreasonable oil consumption.
Additional questions regarding the condition of the excavator
when it arrived on the job site on January 8, 1990,
were presented to Mike Young on Page 153 of the trial record
who responded, that the excavator's electricial system was
not working well,
not new,

(line £5 page 151) That the batteries were

That the Alternator, a major part of the electricial

system, did not work at all, (See page 154 trial record).

Yates

claimed Taylor caused the cab to be loose, caused the electricial
system to not work, caused oil leaks, etc., which simply was not
the truth. All of these malfunctions [were present3 at the time
of sale to Taylor.
Fact six

Page 4

The court
Non

C did not hear Garry Garrett ] . Gary Garrett was the

Disputed

owner

of

the

Excavator

at

the time of sale to

Taylor by Yates since he had not received any payment from
either Yates or

Utah Track & Welding on January S, 1990. In

Barretts testimony, Barratt said while under oath, and Garrett
Cdid not! hear the testimony of Mike Young.

( Neither Young

or Garrett heard the others testimony.). Garrett said, that
when he last saw the excavator, that the Cab [was not] bolted
down, that the excavator Cdid not3 have a functional electrial
system, that the drivers door C was welded 1 shut, that the
rnetal was dented in bad condition.

( See Trial Record Pa\ge 133)

Further Garratt under oath stated he had seen the excavator
just prior to its sale to Taylor, av\d that and that very
alterations or repairs had been made to the machine,
record

page 146, line's 17

little

(see Trial

to £'£' ) .

Fact Seven
Yates, in his deposition, while under oath to tell the truth
responded to Taylors question, -{first you have got to make it
run> Yates -reply, was [Well if you can't make it run you
couldnt check it out] neither Taylor, or any of his help could
make the excavator run.
Fact

eight

While Yates claimed he sent Taylor

the Name of the person who

purchased the Taylor machine, it was the day following the trial
that Taylor [discovered] that Yates Cdid not perform] ar\y of the
Page 5

repairs Yates sa\id were necessary after the machine was
returned to Yates by Taylor. It is a gross injustice to
reward Yates for repairs or work I he did not do II. The machine
had all the defects Yates claimed
and

CPrior to the Sale] to Taylor

II after II the Sale to Acker man.
Fact Nine

Yates,

while

under

people {customers}

oath
what

Trial record page 1£:£,

told

the court that

Ewe] know is wrong

C well tell's the

with the

machine.

line's i,£',3 ). Yates told Taylor that

the excavator he bought was in good condition, but yet he knew
what was wrong with that excavator, and

knew what to claim

Taylor damaged on it. Yates was deceptive, and

unfair with

Taylor, yet Yates told the court on page 176 of the trial
record, line's 3, 4, 5, that definitely not, no I wouldnt,
sell you -{Taylor > something not worth the money, and
goes on to repeat,

,!

NO IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN" which

Yates
leaves

Taylor to beleive That Yates knew that the machine was not
worth the money which he had sold to Taylor.
Fact ten
Taylor perserved his right to a Jury trial. In fact paid the
proper Jury trial fee, and was timely in such filing. The
court has not addressed this issue.
objected both through counsel, and

Taylor has repetedly
pro ~se concerning this fact,

(see page 3, Taylors Brief, bottom senentace.
CONCLUSION

Page 6

The references concerning this matter in the trial court is
found on pages IDE: and 103

of the trial court record the whole

pages refer to the "short circuit " process. What is seems
unreasonable to Taylor is that the court allowed Yates to
amrnend his complaint while in open court, taking Taylor totally
by surprise

and

setting aside the Utah R. Civ- P.,

dealing

with amrnending a complaint, passing the blame to Mr. Johnson
is no reason, for suspension of the Rules. The trial court
judge made it clear that Taylor, " if you are going to represent
yourself, You've got to comply with the Rules of practice11,
(trial Record page 4 ) . Taylor was not supplied a copy of
the findings of fact as the

Utah ftpp. Ct. States.

It was

only after Taylor made a hand written request to the clerk of
the trial court on July £S, 1991? see exhibit 3S, of Taylors
brief, that Taylor received from the court clerk a copy of
*l"!®-J7*ndings of fact and

conclusions of Law to review

after they were signed by the trial pourt^ Jj-l5*9e":_ P^S© two
of the conclusions, do not refer to Yates, statement that
he,

I Jim YatesD told Taylor that the excavator was in

good condition. If that had been fact Taylor would have k.E?pt
the excavator, as Taylor had kept the other equipment he
had purchased from Jim Yates. Taylor was a repeat purchaser,
as Yates always told Taylor, If it doesnt work out for you
bring it back. The conclusions did not correctly refer to the
$ £,£00.00 sales agreement.

The court may ask the question,

Why did Taylor take the the

excavator out of Yates Yard with all the things wrong, that
Taylor complains about„

The Answer is simple. With the

new shiney paint, with the representation of Yates that the
machine was in good condition, with the representation made by
Yates, that if the machine doesnt work for you bring it back,
Sind I will refund your money. Of these there items, two are
absolutely misrepresentations, to induce a sale.

(1) Yates

would not return any money. This law suit proves that point.
<£) The excavator was not in good condition as claimed by
Yates. Yates is claiming Taylor damaged the machine. This is
absolutely false as testified by Young and Garrett, both had
hands on knowledge, which they shared with the court. Discovery
made after the trial, two seperate incidents, Where Yates did
uses

deceptive

sales

practices,

one

a man in Washington, the

other case in Rock Springs Wyoming, point out that Taylor is
not the only victum of Yates. If
this Judgement, This

the court continues to Laffirrnll

will open the door for Yates to rip off

consumer after consumer, with his simple disclaimer, and to back
this up a court Ruling, in support of his (what you see is what
is is) or <sold with out warranty expressed or implied). The
court stated on its memorandum decision -Cdo not publish). Why?
ft land mark decision, allowing that all prior law dealing with
misrepresentation, with deceptive sales practices, should be
important and shared with all equipment dealers, who all want to

be advised in law what the court considers as right in such
matters. Taylor, considers that if the court panel of judges
individually, were each subject to the same conditions as was
Taylor, in connection with this excavator transaction, that all
would join Taylor, and take the excavator back. Taylor Spent
over five thousand Dollars into this machine for very little
return. If the excavator dug 500 feet as testified, that

repair

bill amounted to * 10.00 per foot in repairs only, not to
mention, the

operator, fuel, etc. This is unreasonable. Taylors

Counterclaim, and ammended counterclaim, were considered moot
by the courts. Taylor again apppeals to the court, to reconsider
his counterclaims. Some where something is wrong, when Yates
tells the court, "Yes
condition", and

I told Taylor this1 excavator is in good

Taylor provided the actual Owner at the time

of Sale, -CYates Sold an Excavator to Ta/lor owned by Barrett>
no questions, asked, and further Garran;

said the machine was

aa peice of junk at trial, and yet the <4pp court Affirms, the
Judgement of the lower court. Yates was not damaged. He RE
sold the excavator to another party for more money, since he
Cdid not do the repairs as claimed! The* testimoney of whetstone,
clears up doubt, if in fact there is any doubt after the
testimony of Young, and Garratt, and Ta/lor is reconsidered.
Surely the court panel can see why Yates discounted the machine
$ 1, 000.00. It wasnt to be fair to Taylor. The reason was to
make Taylor feel good, so Taylor would

beleive Yates story,

and excute a corrected agreement,fimmei.dingthe * £,£00.00
agreement.

Good

salesmanship

on

the

part

of expert salesman

One of the reasons Taylor requested a Jury Trial was because
Taylor did not think Judges understand construction Equipment.
When its cold it wont start. When the frost is driven down by
traffic, foot, cars, equipment, etc,

you simply Ccan not]

dig. That is a fact which the court ' s did not take into
consideration at all. No matter how badly Taylor wanted to, or
how much looking unde^, over, or around the excavator, Taylor
would neveir

been able to "check out the Machine" at Yates

Yard in Lehi. Its True

while the machine was being heated and

started Taylor called out certian repairs that needed made.
Construction equipments

sits idle in Utah County durning the

month of January because its to cold to work when the ground
is frozen. Thats Fact, ft Jury Would understand and agree to
that fact, filso the Courts, uphold at

-Ctimes> the written

instrument. Other Times they totally

uphold Parol evidense

over t£e written instrument's. This is confusing, filso a Pro Se
Party has a better chance with a jury, than before a court
Judge, who looks for procedural mistakes, and there are many
times when a Pro Se party is unable to express clearly his
defenses or arguments.

The fact is Taylor was denied his right

to a trial by Jury. The flpp Ct has not address this issue.
Taylor, again Prays, the the ftpp Ct. will consider all the
evidense regarding thfis case, overturn the lower court judgement,
and remand this matter back to the district court so Taylor
can pursue his count *rclaim.^
Dated This

(\ J

^P*y of January 1993.
Taviorvy Pro Se

¥

C I N C O EQUIP!*,*™
1195 EAST M A I f i * LEHI, UTAH 8404.
(801)^768-4406

OLD TO.

i

SHIP TO

T
USTOMER S ORDER NO

BUS PHONE.

RES PHONE

V

DESCRIPTION

YXW&++

^A/
/^/

&

PRICE

/U>

4,*Q.1?&&

Ji

*j c o^-g

/*y&

J?Sl~*

r-*-^

' g w ig_^

feWf S f r * I t i m * Sy UD?fa iMArhri*

h

^

$>CCP //ft. . T &nttA\ T/ W

S£d^^

ZL
>No warranty, expressed or implied, verbal or written
ible lo> dete/minipQ condition of machinery by his own inspection

Customer's Signature

v » -/»

n

:,

!. LES TAX
TO-AL BILLING

i —

™

m^f1
r

-»'

^

i. - /

1

A

Um-hum.

2

Q

Okay.

3

we go through and we discuss what he does. "He has no re-

4

sponsibility other than the fact that he is just a mechanic?"

5

That was the question that I asked you.

6

A

Um-hum.

7

Q

Your reply:

8

but mainly he is a mechanic."

9

A

Um-hum.

10

Q

He is a mechanic there anc' :.hat is what he is

11

there for or he is there?

12

A

Um-hum.

13

Q

Question:

14

"No."

15

you elaborate on those besides being 2 mechanic and so on?"

16

And your answer was:

17

no relevance to the question.

18

were confused when you made that answ.r?

19

A

No. He does that too, yes.

20

Q

Isn't it true that you told me the machine was in

21

excellent condition?

22

A

23

down and check it out and if you like it, buy it, if not,

24

leave it.

25

Question:

(yes) (handing)

We are talking aborj Mr. Vaughn Adams. And

(yes)
"He has a lot of responsibility, yes,

(yes)

"Is he an assistant manager?" Answer:

"You mentioned his responsibilities. Could]

"He is a husband and a homemaker." Hadj
I'm wondering if perhaps you

I toj-d you I thought it was in good condition, coma

Okay.

You did tell me that if it was in good

1

condition then or you admit tellingro.2that?

2J

A

3|

come down and check it out, if you like it, take it, if not, |

4

leave it.

5

Q

6

consider terms like "check the machine out, what you see is

7

what it is" —

8

A

9

Q

Is reasonable?

10

A

You bet.

11

Q

Without being unconscionable?

I admit I stated it was in good condition, you

Do you consider, let's loo* at Exhibit 1, do you

Yes.

12

That's kind --

MR. ANDERSON:

Hs\ft\^

01 ejection, your Honor.

13

"unconscionable11 is a legal term, cal Is for a legal conclu-

14

sion.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. ANDERSON:

If ht- knows, he may answer.
Okay.

17

A

I8

lay it on the line.

19

to court at other times.

20

there is no misunderstanding.

21

Q

22

obligation to inform a prospective buyer if a machine is

23

junk or not?

That is laying it on the line as blunt as you can
I mean, that's »he reason I haven't been
I mean, I j.ay it so bluntly that

(By Mr. Taylor) J)o you fe<l that you have an

24

MR. ANDERSON:

25

THE COURT:

|

0-jection, your Honor.

He roay answer, if he knows.
1 91

1

why I'm inviting the customers in, and they come in time and

2

time again and buy.

3

time to stop payment on your check, but that's the way I

4

represented everything.

5

them.

6

Q

7

sell very much equipment if you said "what you see is what

8

you get" on the advertisements, insteid of being in "good

9

condition"?

10

j\

I donft know whrit happened to you this

And that's :he only way I can sell

In other words, you wouldn t see that you wouldn't

It is in good condition.

11

dition.

12

I don't know.

13

Q

14

is what you get, as is, with no warranties," where is and

15

so forth, may possibly be unconscionable statements?

16

kind of unconscionable, to take advantage of the --

17

A

No, it does not.

18

Q

By having initially taken ad\ ntage of the customer

19

by having initially expressed in effect --

20

And you did buy it.

It was in very good con-

What yo. done to it afterwards,

Do you agree that those sta

THE COURT:

jients, "what you see

Now just a moment.

Don't

21

argue with one another.

22

want you to be argumentative within you~ question, Mr.

23

Taylor.

24

Q

25

scionable statement to have that type of phra oology before

(By Mr. Taylor)

Don't answer tl *» question.

Is that

I don't

I said, isn't it kind of an uncon-

Illl Observation: Under the Restatement, a term unreasonably exempting
a party from the legal consequences of a misrepresentation is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.*4
1 1
or
§ 299. —Stipulations excluding extranet MM repreicnt»*^ffTif CftlT* ** *^
showing fraud
One of the parties to a transaction 01 * jiciiitut memorialized by a writing
subsequent
may attempt to exclude from consider, • ion in the event of
— •
...i«:«u
remarks,
or
representations
which
controversy or litigation, any statements,
tions,
or
any
such
representations
may have been made during the negotu
which may not be included in the writing . tself. Such efforts at exclusion have
generally been unsuccessful where such statements or representations are
found to have been madefraudulentlyor i i be of such nature that a charge of

79. Restatement, Contracts 2d § 195. """ "—* --**
80. Industrial & General Trust v Tod
215, 75 NE 7; Christian Mills. Inc

17AAmJur2d
CONTRACTS

§299
-act." that neither party o»u

jcm.™ that the writing contains the entire
any representation not contained t! u'» thrre is no warranty nnf spmfirally set
iS
~
i
i
Vie
tm-TT^fi,
a
n
d
^
nt
0
t

even though a written agreemem ww..
pts to eummaiv
m
any extraneous statements or actions.* Fraud wil| vitiate any rnntraq pfocured;
thereby, and it is in application of thirrule that stipulations seeking to avoid
the result of fraud in procuring contracts are held to be inoperative and
ineffectual in this regard.14
In some jurisdictions effect is ,wcu In stipulations in written agreements
which attempt to nullify the effee of any representations which may have been
made extraneous to the written memorial. The courts following this view
emphasize the desirability of cert < v\ty in the contractual relations of those who
have made a definite agreemen ; and if the parties say that they contract
without regard to prior repress tations, and that prior utterances have not
been an inducement to their co \ *nt, any occasional damage to the individual
IS. »n»M • ^ ' ^ " S " * ^ " ' ' -

^

88. Nelson v Leo's Auto Sales, Inc., i!>8 ML
368, 185 A2d 121; Nash Mississippi Valley
Viator Co. v Childress, 156 Miss 157, 125 So
.708; Land Finance Corp. v Sherwin Electric
'Co., 102 Vt 75, 146 A 72. 75 ALR 1025.
89. Arnold v National Aniline ic Chemical (AI
ICA2 NY) 20 F2d 564, 56 ALR 4

ISO.
.
90. Jordan v Nelson (Iowa) 178 NW 644, L0
'J ,
M . Arnold v National Iff"**^
(CA2 NY) 20 F2d 364. * A £ , * i 7 o t ] )6 NW ALR 1464; Ganley Bros, v Buder Bros. Bldg.
Co., 170 Minn 373, 212 NW 6 0 ^ 56 ALR 1,
well tc Co. v Jacobson.130i Iowal ^
^
Meyer v Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106
614; Canley Broj. vltatter »ro
Secu.
Ohio St 528, 1 Ohio L Abs 80, 140 NE 118, 28
170 Holding
Minn 373.
« vyChn«enseno
M ^ i M S D *?.^ 219
nty
Co.
^ ALR 986; Motor Contract Co. v Van Der Vol
gen, 162 Wash 449, 298 P 705, 79 ALR 29
Baylies v Vanden Boom, 40 Wyo 411, 27ft 1
551,70 ALR 924.
91. Bowersock v Barker. 186 Okla 48. 96 P2
(CA2 NY) M r «
itract |haf u
M>1

U O U B W U U U tci uvtumuie vo m e cousfli

!er, ribbon, token,
flower, flag, button,
idy, or any other
trinket, tag, souvei
which any appeal
article in connection
is made for any charitable purpose, or where
the name of any charitable organization or
movement is used or referred to as an inducement or reason for making any purchase
donation, or where, in connection with any
sale or donation, any statement L made that
the whole or any part of the proceeds of any
sale or donation will go to or be donated to
any charitable purpose. A charitable solicitation is considered complete when made,
whether or not the organization or person
making the'solicitation receives any contribution:"br makes any sale.
(2)- "Consumer • transaction" means " a Bale,
leaser assignment, award by chance, or other
written or oral transfer or disposition of goods,
services, or other property, both tangible and intangible (except securities and insurance), to a
person for primarily personal, family, or household purposes, or for purposes that relate to a
business opportunity that requires both his expenditure of money or property and his personal
services on a continuing basis and in which he
Has not been previously engaged, or a solicitation
or offer by a supplier with respect to any of these
transfers or dispositions. It includes any offer or
solicitation, any agreement, any performance of
an agreement with respect to any of these transfers or dispositions, and any charitable solicitation as defined in this section.
(3) "Enforcing authority" means the Division
\J Consumer Protection.
4) "Final judgment" means a judgment, including any supporting opinion, that determines
':he rights of the parties and concerning which
8j\iellate remedies have been exhausted or the
tine for appeal has expired.
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation,
government, governmental . subdivision or
agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership,
association, cooperative, or any other legal en,
\t&y. -vi-"."^^^'*;'..„.,•,- ,..•..-,:
"'IV
(6) ^Supplier* means a seller, lessor, assignor,
.offeror, broker, or other person who regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not he deals directly with the
consumer. :r ';V.';;i.Viv# - ;•'.• V ^^rj^.s^y.. MOT
1J-ll-4. Deceptive act or practice by supplier.
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer transaction violates this
chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the
transition.
" .(2) "Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a
supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if UM»
supplier, with intent to deceive.*
v\\) indicates that the subject of a consumer
J
a."sisaction has sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits if it has not;
_i^Lindic£j£iUhat^

jgansaction is,of a particular standard, quality*
grade^ style, or modeL if it is not:
"TTS3 mmcates tEat ,tna .'subject of a consumer
transaction is new, or unused, if it is not, or has
bean used to an extent that is materially different from the fad;

reason that does not exist; V I ^ U M
(e) indicates that the subject OPfH
transaction has been supplied in accord
a previous representation, if it has M
(f) indicates that the subject of a i
transaction will be supplied in greater
than the supplier intends;
- $0$
(g) indicates that replacement br^i
needed, if it is not;
:*1
(h) indicates that a specific price i
exists, if it does not;
\'S^$j
(i) indicates that the supplier has •
ship, approval, or affiliation he, does 1
(j) indicates that a consumer^transa
volves or does not involve a warrant;
claimer of warranties, particular 1
terms, or other rights, remedies, or oblig
the representation is false; .,.,;,/ :. |
(k) indicates that the consumer will 1
rebate, discount, or other benefit as an
ment for entering into a consumer trans
return for giving the supplier the name
spective consumers or otherwise helping
plier to enter into other consumer transa
receipt of the benefit is contingent oft 4
occurring after the consumer enters i
transaction;
G) after receipt of payment for
vices, fails to ship the goods or furnish
vices within the time advertised or oi
represented or, if no specific time is adve
represented, fails to ship the goods or fur
services within 30 days, unless within tl
cable time period the supplier provides tl
with the option to either cancel the salt
ment and receive a refund of all previ<
ments to the supplier or to extend the i
date to a specific date proposed by the I
but any refund shall be mailed or deliver*
buyer within ten business days after ti
receives written notification from the 1
the buyer's right to cancel the sales ag
and receive the refund;
;&*
(m) fails to furnish a notice of the puir
right to cancel a direct solicitation sale
three business days at the time of purcha
sale is made other than at the supplier1
lished place of business pursuant to the si
mail, telephone, or personal contact an
. sale price exceeds $25, which notice sh
, conspicuous statement written in bold
immediate proximity to the space resei
the signature of the buyer, as follows:
THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS
TRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MIE
OF THE THIRD BUSINESS DAY AFT!
DATE OF THE TRANSACTION."; <**
(n) promotes, offers, or grants particip
a pyramid scheme as defined under Cha;
Title 76; or
>•^
(o) represents that the funds or propei
veyed in response to a charitable solicitat
be donated or used for a particular pur
will be donated to or used by a particular
zation, if the representation is false.
13-11-5. Unconscionable act or practice''
• plier. •

•

\,||

(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a I
in connection with a consumer transaction'^

5282. The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practice* At* , t
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,- piomulgated in 1964 and
revised in 1966, has been adopted in either the earlier or later version by a
number of states,1 albeit with additions, variations, omissions, and the like.
. The Act provides that a person engages in a der^iiv^ tr*A* pnrt;~ w K r
in the course of his business, vocation, or <^cupation, hr- (1) pa«<^ off goods
or services as those of another: (2) causes likelihood of confiisionorof
93. l a i r Reviews: Sebert, Enforcement of
State Deceptive Trade Practice Statutes 42
Tenn L Rev 689 (1975).

Trade Commission II i |15 USCS | | 4
49 ALR Fed 16
97. Fonseca, Handling Consumer
Cases 3d 11:8.

94.15USCS8l41ecieq.
95. FTC v Speny tc Hutchinson Co., 405 US
233, SI L Ed 2d 170, 92 S O 898, 1972 CCH
Trade Cases 175861.
96. Fonseca, Handling Consumer Cicilit
Cases 3d 11:8.
LMW Review*: Cilleran and Stadfcld, Link
FTC Acts Emerge in Business Liugauon. 72
ABA} 58 May 1.1986.
Annotations: What constitutes "false advei
Using" of food products or cosmetics within
IS 5 and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (15 USCS If 45, 52), 50 ALR Fed 16.
What constitutes "false advertising" of drugs
or devicci within II 5 and 12 of tnc Federal

ir I

98. See, for example. Commonwealth _
Creamer v Monumental Properties, Inc., 45!
Pa 450, S29 A2d 812, on remand 26 Pa
Cmwlth S99, 565 A2d 442; Uneedus v California Shoppers, Inc. (4th Dist) 86 Cat App 3d
932, 150 Cal Rptr 596, 1979-2 CCH Trade
Cases 162845.
f».UDTPA||*etseq.
1. Am JUT 2d, Desk Book, Item No. 124,
indicating such states as Colorado, Delaware,
Georgia, Hawa+v Illinois, Maine, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
Oregon.
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crond* or s e r v e s : <3) causey likelihood ol c o m m o n or in u » u ^ u a u u » u u ^

f o S u o n , cormecdon7
with, or certification by. another; (4)
uses deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods or services; < * f # ^
sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingrediee u, uses, benefits, or quantities
that they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status,
S a d o n , or connection that he does not have: ( 6 > ^ * p n » < ^
original or new if they are deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed,
original ui * * * 7 t "

, Jmx

A1 _ #

^_

4

^ . T i r i ^ i ar* nf a narticular

used, or i
standard,
thev are ox anoiner; \oj uuji««uw *»«* 6w%.», »*...«.—. -_• ^
by false or misleading representation of fact; (J) advertises goods or services
3kh intent not to sell them as advertised; (10) advertises goods or services
with intent not to supply reas6nabiy expectable public demand, unless the
adverSement disclose? a limitation of quantity; (11) makes false or misleadmg
statements of fact concerning the reasons for existence of, or amounts ot pnee
!".!^f"n" nr l\2\ engages in any other conduct whiUl slmlUlly UUCP a
S e C d I orconfUsionVol J S d e r t B H a g ^ Ihe Act proves ddUUUUni
of the terms used therein.*
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A
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2

Q

Um-hu:

3

A

You.

I

THV,

i

•

ives)

' *' MII>I. iiM i L,..ii Company did not own that machine'

(witness nodding affirmation'

Q

'Arid thai was ri./n'lv . n c; • i; u i • j 10 you.

Is that

correct'"'
MR, ANDERSON:
to interrupt.

MR. ANDERS0!

1

7.:-r

lo 1

•I

, . •".

ight,

( B y Mr
»• v - K *

•
1

• d I T ..nn.-.i « f , t.

^.ANDERSON:

la '

... ,.. ,
Four-

1 ,1 1 1 , 1

Whose?

-

15 J

I'm sorr\

-.-

- hr 1

4

^. '

Thank vo J .

• <" 1 '

me

dteil en

t ha I1 1 1-

between breakdowns.

uui I |

>«1: « • * • • If•' f

in, in

•8

i;\
.ill

•

Because everything just was v.- , Ou.u uri

Q

Was the cab bolted down tx&i*,

A

No.

11

,J

Secure?

iv

No.

24 I

c.

Did i 1 leak ci I "'

25

A

All over.

We put two barrels oi it in 1L to run
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1

Q

Were the batteries new?

2

A

No,

3

Q

Did you take the batteries out and replace them

4

with some old batteries?

5

A

No, I didn't.

6

MR. TAYLOR:

Thii> has already been marked,

7

I don't know, I want to re-, do I need to re-mark this?

8

wasn't accepted.

9

Q

It

(off record with clerk)

(By Mr. Taylor)

I want to show you what has been

10

marked as Defendant's Exhibit 8.

I want you to carefully

11

read those items, and then I'm going to ask you if they

12

pertain to that particular machine.

13

A

The air cleaner?

14

Q

How about the batteries?

15

A

Two batteries.

16

_Q

17

A

It didn't work.

18

Q

Did it ever work?

19

A

No.

20

Q

How did you start the m a c M n e ?

21

A

We had to jump it to start it.

22

Q

If you were to buy a machine of that type, first

23

of all -- strike that question.

24

dupont-overhaul.

25 I

A

How about the alternator?

The machine had a fresh

Tell me what that \s?

Well, it's a new paint job

-0\-

and you buy a used

"*

1

future value in it, I'd have kept iv.

2

business for 23 years.

3

out.

4

it, I would have done it.

5

hundred dollars with it, I'd have dore it.

6

we elected to do that with it.

7

Q

8

said that he disagrees --

I've been in the

I know when a.mething's been worn

If I could have made another thousand dollars worh of

9

If I could have made another
But we didn't,

Did you ever hear with yout own ears, Roland Olman

MR. ANDERSON:

I'M object to even start-

10

ing that question, your Honor, if hes, going to ask the wit-

11

ness if he's heard something someone else has said, that's

12

patently hearsay, and I object to it.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. TAYLOR:

The objection is sustained.
Okay.

Thinking about how to

15

rephrase the question.

16

Q

17

machine?

18

A

No, sir, it was not.

19

Q

Did it have a functional electrical system?

20

A

No, sir, it did not.

21

Q

Was the driver's door welded shut?

22

A

Yes, it was.

23

Q

Was the m^ral in r'^toH

24

A

Yes, it was.

25

on side and pretty well destroyed the cab on it.

(By Mr. Taylor)

Was the cab securely bolted to the

in •• ,-d condition?

It was previous .y tipped that machine

n-
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1

wouldn't you?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

I'm sorry, I didn't hear that.

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Okay.

6

when you get something that disclaims warranties for failures]

7

no warranties, sold as is; what does tfcu t mean when you buy

8

a machine like that?

9

A

10

What does that mean to you, Mr. Garrett,

That means you are buying it w.he way it is, just

like it says.

11

MR. ANDERSON:

12

Thank you, Mr. Garrett.

No fv cher questions.

13

THE COURT: Any further, Mr. Taylor?

14

MR. TAYLOR:

15

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

I only have one question.

16

BY MR. TAYLOR:

17

Q

18

already answered it; but when you went baei: and looked at

19

the machine after it had been repainted, ul/.l you indicate

\0

to me or was it your testimony that there Vui been very littld

1

alterations or repairs made to the machii^?

2

Yes.

i

Q

'

maybe I'll rephrase that.

And this is, maybe I overlooked it, maybe you've

Did I ask you the question that if you, isn't it —
Isn't it a commct- place, when you

buy equipment and they represent to you tha: it's in good
146
&*>

1 BY MR. GUY TAYLOR
2

Q

3 you see

Okay!going back to check che machine ouf'what
is what it is" does this nean.Mr. Yates,that you

4 stand back 20 feet and look at the machine and that is the
5 check out?
6

A

That means you can do anything you want to do with th£t

7 machine other than tip it over an-.- wreck

it in my yard.

8 In my yard there is a place out tc.ore you can go with a
9 backhoe and can go dig with and can run it around and check
10 it out.
11

I understand that you die that.

Q .First of all you have

to get it to run isn^t that

12 truetMr. Yates?
13

A

Welltif you can't make it run you couldn't

14 check it out.
15

Q

That is true.

16

A

Anyway I don't think I c:t,d, maybe you could.

17 Did you buy this not running?
18

Q

Unfortunately Jim, I am asking the questions.

19

A

Okay we will play your ga-ie.

20

Q

All right if the machine is purchased, I am going

21 to rephrase that.
22

A

Okay.

23

Q

If a machine is purchased from a person who made

24 the representaiton that the macht ie is junk,and you put
25 a paint job on it, does that meap that you can, in good

;

V&f^ Wef^d'o^i jfci(o*s>Jbflt t<P 37^

26

1

A

If a machine, we sell a lot of stuff that is not

2 J

repaired and that, and if we know of anything wrong with it,

3

we do tell the people what we know is wrong with the machine.

4

Q

5

who owned the machine prior to youv obtaining it so that I

6

could call and talk to the previous owner?

7

A

Which time?

8

Q

At anytime.

9

A

I've told you it come f^vn Utah Track, right, um-

(By Mr. Taylor)

Do you recall that I asked you

At any one .ime.

10 hum.
11

Q

Are you sure that you tcxd me it come from Utah

12

Track?

13

A

14

Track, yes, I'm sure I told you it come from Utah Track.

15

Q

16

because I'm going to come back to chat question.

17 I

honest, Jim.

18

A

19

y e s , I mean,

20

Q

21

remember t h e g u y ' s name who was t h e p r e v i o u s owner?

22

A

No, i t i s n o t .

23

Q

And then the previous c^ner?

24

A

Immediate, uh-huh.

25 I

Q

The term "check the mac line out, what you see is

Well, I'm sure I've tol';. you it come from Utah

You are sure on that?

1'm going to ask you again,
Let's be

If you would have askeo me, I would have told you,

Isn't i t true that you :old me that you couldn't

Utah Tr >ck.

" *~

That's who I bought it from.

122

1

Q

Would it have been your in1ention to have sold me

2

a piece of equipment that wasn't worth of money?

3

Ji

4

have been my intention to sell you something not worth the

5

money.

Definitely not,

no, it wouldn't.

No, it would not have been.

6

MR. TAYLOR:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. ANDERSON:

9

It would not

Okay.

No further question.

Any naestions.
M.™ I approach the bench

and get some exhibits, your Honor?
THE COURT:

11

MR. ANDERSON:

12

FURTHER DIRECT EIiXMINATION

13

MR. ANDERSON:

01;>y, we are missing an

exhibit.

16

MR. TAYLOR:

17

MR. ANDERSON:

18

I * il be as quick as I can.

BY MR. ANDERSON:

14
15

You

v.iy.

10

Q

(By Mr. Anderson)

19

Woul-i it be 9?
It would be 9, possibly.

Okay, JJa, just tie this down.

MR. ANDERSON:

I 'a going to approach the

20

witness, your Honor.

21

Q

22

That's the original document wherein :he machine was sold to

23

Mr. Taylor.

24

A

That f s right, uh-huh.

25

Q

On that document it talks a'jout warranties in two

(By Mr. Anderson)

Showing vou Exhibit No. 1.

Is that correct?

1

purpose of the under the Code, 7QA-2-315:

2

fitness for the purpose, where the selle.; at the time of con-

3

tracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which

4

the goods are required and the buyer is relying on the seller

5

skill and judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, unles^

6

excluded or modified under the next secticn.

7

warranty.

8
9

Implied warranty,

An implied

Now, Mr. Yates represented to me that the machine
was in good condition.

You heard the testimony, your Honor,

10

right here.

He said it was in good condition, in fact even

11

went so far on one occasion to say that i~ was in excellent

12

condition at the time that it was picked up by me to try out.

13

The matter of the second agreement or the agreement

14

made in the Century Equipment yard.

15

ment had some conditions.

That ^articular agree-

Your Honor, Condition 1. was Mr.

16 J Yates said "hey, if the machine doesn't work out for ygu^,
17

bring it back and I'll give you your moneyJback."

18

representationwas made t h a t h e o w e d the b^nk for the machine

19

and with the machine gone he was out of trist, and based on

20

that it was reasonable that a check would be tendered so that

21

he was not sold out of trust.

*2

recognize that that, on that basis the che;.'; was issued.

!3

~

No. 2. , th£

You heard t';at testimony and

Also, the contract was not renegotiated, it was

4

merely corrected.

The correction made to vne contract, the

5

second one, was simply the amount of $22,00° replaced $2,200,

Q^t'/l
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The Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act
Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act4 was promulgated in 1970 and
ed in 1971. It has been adopted by only a few states.9 Among the
es of the Act are the protection of consumers from suppliers who
in deceptive and unconscionable sales practices,9 and to make state
ion of consumer sales practices not inconsbtent with the policies of the
1 Trade Commission Act relating to consumer protection.7
ally, the Act prohibits deceptive acts or practices by a supplier in
tion with a consumer transaction whether they occur before, during, or
le transaction,9 and sets forth in detail a number of acts or practices
ire considered to be deceptive.9
Act prohibits unconscionable acts or practices by a supplier in conneo
th a consumer transaction.19 The unconscionability of an act or practice
estion of law for the court, but the parties may be given a reasonable
unity to present evidence to aid the court in mating its determination.11
:t specifies in detail the circumstances which the court may consider in
ining whether an act or practice is unconscionable.11 The Act defines
its used therein.11
PA § 2(a).
dons: Actionable nature of advcrtisgning quality or worth of merchandise
as, 42 ALR4th 318.

€. UCSPA } 1(2).

PA§1.

9.UCSPAJS(D)(1)-(11).

'A §5 1 et teq.

10. UCSPA 14.

Jur 2d, Desk Book, Item No. 124
t a footnote, indicates that three states
med the Act. These states are Kansas.

11. UCSPA § 4(b).

7. UCSPA S 1(4).
8. UCSPA § S(a).

12. UCSPA M(c)(l)-(6).

-^s--
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liability.

{^98. Provision waiving, or immunizing from, bad faith or fraud
No covenant of immunity can be drawn that will protect a person who acts
in bad faith, because such a stipulation is against public policy, and the courts
will not enforce it.* Similarly, the law does not permit a covenant of immunity
to be drawn that will protect a person against his own fraud; such a covenant
is unenforceable because of public policy." A party to a contract cannot, hy
misrepresentation of a material fact, induce the other party to enter inrn th*
contract to his damage, and then protect himself from the leyal effect of such
misrepresentation by inserting a clause in the contract to the effect that he is
not to be held liable for the misrepresentation.^, It is a general rule that
provisions in a contract—tor example, one for the sale of real **t*to nr
personal property—the purpose of which is to secure from the vendee or
buyer, in advance, a waiver of or estoppel against anv claim of fraud on the
part of the vendor or seller, or his agent or representative, in securing the
contract, will not be given effect to preclude the former from setting up or
relying upon such fraud in order to defeat the contract or avoid liability
thereunder.*
•
1111 Observation: Under the Restatement, a term unreasonably exempting
a party from the legal consequences of a misrepresentation is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.*
§ 299. —Stipulations excluding extraneous representations constituting or
showing fraud
One of the parties to a transaction or agreement memorialized by a writing
may attempt to exclude from consideration, in the event of subsequent
controversy or litigation, any statements, remarks, or representations which
may have been made during the negotiations, or any such representations
which may not be included in the writing itself. Such efforts at exclusion have
generally been unsuccessful where such statements or representations are
found to have been made fraudulently or to be of such nature that a charge of
79. Restatement, Contracts 2d § 195.
80. Industrial k General Trust v Tod, 180 NY
215, 73 NE 7; Christian Mills. Inc. v Savoia
Macaroni Mfg. Co., 228 App Div 717, 239 NYS
283.
81. United States v United States Cartridge
Co. (CA8 Mo) 198 F2d 456. cert den 345 US
910, 97 L Ed 1345. 73 S Ct 645; Sovereign
Camp. W. O. W. v Heflin, 188 Ga 234. 3 SE2d
559; Jordan v Nelson (Iowa) 178 NW 544, 10
ALR 1464; Bates v Southgate, 308 Mass 170,
31 NE2d 551. 133 ALR 1349 (disapproving the
distinction stated in Colonial Development
Corp. v Bragdon, 219 Mass 170, 106 NE 633,
between fraud "antecedent" to the contract
and feud "entering into the making" thereof);
Ganley Bros, v-Butler Bros. Bldg. Co., 170
Minn 373, 212 NW 602. 56 ALR 1; Young
Fehlhabcr Pile Co. v State. 265 App Div 61. 37

NYS2d 928; Baylies v Vanden Boom. 40 Wyo
411, 278 P 551, 70 ALR 924.
82. Ganlev Bros, v Butler Bros. Bldg. Co.. 170
Minn 373. 212 NW 60? 56 AIR 1- Yminr
FVhlHah^r Pilg flft. v Staff ?ft* App n i v fil %1

flY5SrS28

83. Arnold v National Aniline k Chemical Co.
(CA2 NY) 20 F2d 364. 56 ALR 4; Barrie v
Miller, 104 Ga 312, 30 SE 840; B. F. Bonewell
k Co. v jacobson, 130 Iowa 170, 106 NW 614;
Ganley Bros, v Butler Bros. Bldg. Co., 170
Minn 373. 212 NW 602. 56 ALR 1; Land
Finance Corp. v Sherwin Electric Co., 102 Vt
73, 146 A 72. 75 ALR 1025; Holcomb k Hoke
Mfg. Co. v Auto Interurban Co., 140 Wash
581, 250 P 34. 51 ALR 39; Baylies v Vanden
Boom. 40 Wyo 411, 278 P 551, 70 AIfl«24.

84. Restatement. Cffltttttf 2<* 1196J
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Mf the parties. Any such specification must be
I in good faith and within limits set by commer1 reasonableness.
.Unless otherwise agreed specifications relating
aent of the goods are at the buyer's option
itxcept as otherwise provided in Subsections (l)(c)
i (3) of Section 70A-2-319 specifications or arents relating to shipment are at the seller's
i Where such specification would materially aft the other party's performance but is not seasonf made or where one party's cooperation is necesr to the agreed performance of the other but is not
bly forthcoming, the other party in addition
fill other remedies
*'<a) is excused for any resulting delay in his
performance; and
(b) may also either proceed to perform in any
I reasonable manner or after the time for a mate"rial part of his own performance treat the failure
to specify or to cooperate as a breach by failure to
deliver or accept the goods.
lses

porting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. ISM
70A-2-314. Implied warranty — Merchantability — U s a g e of trade.
(1) Unless
excluded
or modified
(Section
70A-2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind. Under this section the servicing for value of
food or drink to be consumed either on the premises
or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such
as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under
the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair
average quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the
agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity
within each unit and among all units involved;
and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and
labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of
fact made on the container or label if any.
(3) Unless
excluded
or modified
(Section
70A-2-316) other implied warranties may arise from
course of dealing or usage of trade.
1966

1-2-312. Warranty of title a n d against infringement — Buyer's obligation
against i n f r i n g e m e n t
Ml) Subject to Subsection (2) there is in a contract
• sale a warranty by the seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its
transfer rightful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from an;
• security interest or other lien or encumbrance
70A-2-315. Implied warranty — Fitness for particular purpose.
• which the buyer at the time of contracting has
^
Where the seller at the time of contracting lias reaknowledge.
Ison to know any particular purpose Tor which tEe
2) A warranty under Subsection (1) will be
[goods are required and that tne buyer is relying on t
or modified only by specific language
stances which give the buyer reason to
>w ^ the seller's s y j J ^ ^ ^ ^ T t e S M O T j ^ ^ S j H r i
it the person selling does not claim title in
If able goods, there is unless exduded^rjnodified under^
ihe next section an*lmpfie?lirarrajity thatl^ie^rads"*
rthat he is purporting to sell only such right or
shall be fit for such purpose.
1965
I he or a third person may have.
"(3) Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a
70A-2-316. Exclusion or modification of wart regularly dealing in goods of the kind warranl
Mfcanti
ranties — Livestock.
; the goods shall be delivered free of the rightfi
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an
L of any third person by way of infringement or
xpress warranty and words or conduct tending to
• like but a buyer who furnishes specifications to
• limit warranty shall be construed wherever
> seller must hold the seller harmless against any reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject
fgoch claim which arises out of compliance with the to the provisions of this chapter on parol or extrinsic
[verifications.
1966 evidence (Section 70A-2-202) negation or limitation
is inoperative to the extent that such construction is
fQA-2-313. E x p r e s s warranties b y affirmation, unreasonable.
£,
promise, description, sample.
(2) Subject to Subsection (3), to exclude or modify
-4,(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as the implied warranty of merchantability or any part
Allows:
of it the language must mention merchantability and
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by
in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exthe seller to the buyer which relates to the goods clude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the
^ and becomes part of the basis of the bargain cre- exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Lanates an express warranty that the goods shall
guage to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is
conform to the affirmation or promise.
sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no
(b) Any description of the goods which is made warranties which extend beyond the description on
. part of the basis of the bargain creates an express the face hereof."
warranty that the goods shall conform to the de(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)
scription.
(a) unless the circumstances indicate other(c) Any sample or model which is made part of
wise, all implied warranties are excluded by exthe basis of the bargain creates an express warpressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other
M' ranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to
language which in common understanding calls
Sj
the sample or model.
) *
tflfe Duyer's attention to the exclusion of warran[ (2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express
ties and makes plain that there is no implied
warranty that the seller use formal words such as
warranty; and
^warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific
(b) when the buyer before entering into the
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation
contract has examined the goods or the sample or
tterely of the value of the goods or a statement purmodel as fully as he desired or has refused to

i
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY

2

STATE OF UTAH

3

JIM YATES,
Plaintiff,

4
5

VS.

6

GUY TAYLOR,

7

STATE OF OREGON

9

County of Tillamook.

jj
12

Civil No. 900 400 61

)

AFFIDAVIT OF DAN WHETSTONE

Defendant.

g

]0

)

ss.

I, DAN WHETSTONE, being first duly sworn and upon oath,
depose and say as follows:
1.

I am the mechanic who had done repair work on a Case

13

980 Excavator, Serial No. 6203826, which was purchased from Mr.

14

Jim Yates in Lehi, State of Utah.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

2.

I was present when this machine arrived in Tillamook,

Oregon, and helped unload this machine.
3.

This machine had a large pool of oil under it, it had

to be jumped started, and would barely move off the trailer.
4.

The machine had been advertised in My Little Salesman,

June 1990 edition, and was priced for $22,000.00.
5.

Randy Ackerman went to Utah and purchased this machine,

6.

Randy Ackerman works on a commercial fishing boat and

is at sea.

Mr. Ackerman has been unable to use the machine to

date on his property for the purpose he intended to use the
machine.
7.

Since the machine arrived in Oregon, I have worked on

the machine off and on for a total time of two weeks.
/////
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AFFIDAVIT OF DAN WHETSTONE.
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8.

The batteries were old, and I put new batteries in the

1
machine.

The windshield was missing.

The side door window was

cracked.

The wiring system was out of order except for the

2
3
ignition switch and starter button.

I am still working on the

4
wiring.

The gages did not work.

There are many serious

5
hydraulic leaks.

The track motors had to be rebuilt, and one

6
digging break had to be rebuilt.
7
9.

The machine was not in good condition as advertised in

8
the June 1990 edition of rfy Little Salesman.
9
10.

10

The total price of $22,000.00 has been paid for the

machine.

11

11.

This price included delivery to Tillamook, Oregon.
The machine is still not working properly and has

12
$3,500+ more that must be invested to get the machine to work
13
properly.
14
Further this affiant sayeth not.
15
DATED this \&

day of June, 199*.

16
17

||

18

||

DAN WHETSTONE
Subscribed and sworn to before me this J O
1991.

day of June,

19
20

ssssfe^s^asss,^^^^^^^^^^
II ^ SSssS3 s3Sfe^
3sa5S5=:s _ ss< ^___

21

r

22

few

... r f ***?-* A. HUL8UHT

Notary
regon^/
Notary PPuubblliicc ffoorr OOregon

K

^ ^ ^ ^ . ( W I 4 1 7
>JULY29;iS«i

23
24
25
26
27
28
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JIM YATES
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER:

vs.

900400061

RULING

GUY TAYLOR
Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501, on
the motion of defendant seeking a ruling on defendants
objections to Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order. The Court has reviewed the file, and upon being advised
in the premises, now makes the following:
RULING
1. The Court declines to rule apon said matter for the
reason that no proposed written findings of fact, conclusions of
law and order have yet been submitted to the Court by counsel for
the plaintiff as directed at the close ol the trial. Defendant's
objections and motion are thus premature.
Dated this 20th day of June, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

CULLE
cc:

Guy Taylor
Gary Anderson, Esq.
Jim Yates

M-

CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE

^

Guy Taylor, Pro Se
H.C. 2 Box 40
Duchesne, Utah 84021

i#$r

0

Telephone No. (801) 738-2608
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JIM YATES DBA CINCO EQUIPMENT

AFFIDAVIT OF GUY TAYLOR

Plaintiff/ Appellee,
CASE NO. 900400061 CV

VS
GUY TAYLOR,
Defendant/Appallant

HONORABLE CULLEN Y.
CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE

THE AFFIANT GUY TAYLOR, BEING FIRST SWORN, SAYS:
1. A TAPE RECORDING, AND AFFIDAVIT OF DAN WHETSTONE, COULD
ONLY BE OBTAINED, AFTER THE COURT TRIAL, SINCE THE NAME OF
THE PARTY THE PLAINTIFF SOLD THE EXCAVATOR TO, WAS NOT SUPPLIED
TO THE DEFENDANT PRIOR TO TRIAL. [DISCOVERY DURNING THE TRIAL
(A COPY OF A FAX TRANSMISSION FROM THE PLAINTIFF TO COUNSEL)
J WAS INTRODUCED TO THE DEFENDANT DURNING THE COURT TRIALD. THIS
FAX TRANSMISSION WAS ALTERED,AND THIS FACT WAS PRESENTED TO
THE COURT (tr 111) ENCLOSED, DEFENDANTS EXHIBIT 1.
or
Z

o J

2. THE

AFFIDAVIT

STATES

THE

FOLLOWING

MACHINE AT TILLAMOOK, OREGON.
<1) THE BATTERIES WERE OLD
<£) THE WINDSHIELD WAS MISSING
(3) THE SIDE DOOR WINDOW WAS CRACKED
(4) THE WIRING SYSTEM WAS OUT OF ORDER

[AFTER]

RECEIVING THE

<5> THE GAGES DO NOT WORK
(6) THERE ARE MANY HYDROLIC LEAKS
(7) THE TRACK MOTOR HAD TO BE REBUILT
(8) ONE DIGGING BRAKE HAD TO BE REBUILT
(9) THE MACHINE WOULD BARELY MOVE OFF THE TRAILER
(10) THE MACHINE HAD A LARGE POOL OF OIL UNDER IT.
<11) THE MACHINE WAS ADVERTIZED IN THE JUNE EDITION OF
MY LITTLE SALESMAN AS BEING IN GOOD CONDITION.
(1£) THE MACHINE CWAS NOT] IN GOOD CONDITION AS ADVERTISED
IN MY LITTLE SALESMAN.
3. THE DEFENDANT INTRODUCED THE JUNE (6-90) EDITION OF MY LITTLE
SALESMAN AT TRIAL AND IT WAS ACCEPTED AS DEFENDANTS EXHIBIT 10.
4. THE DEFENDANT [DISCOVERED] THAT NONE OF THE WORK CLAIMED
BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS EVER DONE TO SAID EXCAVATOR, AS CLAIMED
IN PLAINTIFFS TRIAL EXHIBIT 9, WHICH SPECIFICALLY

IDENTIFIED

THE COSTS AND EXPENSES THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMED WERE MADE AS A
RESULT OF THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANTS USE OF SAID
EXCAVATOR.
5. DEFENDANT HAS AVAILABLE CNEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCED FROM
THE PURCHASER OF THE HEIN WARNER MACHINE, MENTIOND DURNING
THE COURT TRIAL, WHERE THRE PLAINTIFF MISREPRESENTED THE
CONDITION OF THAT MACHINE ALSO. THIS MANS NAME IS GEORGE
COLLINS, WHO RESIDES IN ROCK SPRINGS WYOMING TELEPHONE
NUMBER

307 38£ 5463. [DISCOVERY] NOW INDICATES THAT THREE

PARTIES HAVE BEEN RIPPED OFF, THE DEFENDANT,

WHETSTONE/ACKERMAN,

AND GEORGE COLLINS, ALL HAVE BEEN RIPPED OFF BY THE PLAINTIFF.

IN ADDITION, THE COURT LIKEWISE MADE A DECISION BASED UPON
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS NOT TRUE. (pLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT 9 ) .
6. DEFENDANT FEELS THE COURT SHOULD, IN THE INTERST OF JUSTICE,
RELEIVE THE DEFENDANT FROM THIS JUDGEMENT WHICH WAS OBTAINED
THROUGH FRAUD.
DATED THIS 30TH DAY OF JULY 1992.

^ /O

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 31ST
JULY 1992.

DAY OF

NOTARY PUBLIC
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I CERTIFY I MAILED A COPY OF THE FOREGOING TO THE FOLLOWING
POSTAGE PREPAID AT DUCHESNE UTAH, THIS 31ST DAY OF JULY
199£.
MR GARY ANDERSON, ESQ
ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF
750 NORTH £00 WEST, SUITE 102
PROVO, UTAH 84601

the backside there, in case you are wondering what that is,
that's where your man was told not to sign it.
the day he brought that in.

Wrote that up

That gives his name and every-

thing at the bottom.
THE COURT:

Now just a moment, wait until

he asks you a question, Mr. Yates.
THE WITNESS:
Q
for it.

(By Mr. Taylor)

Okay.

Thank you, sir.

What date was this?

I was looking

Usually, a Fax machine will leave a date that a

transaction is faxed to a»party.
cut off of this.

And I note that's been

Was that for some reason?

A

It certainly wasn't.

Q

I mean, after all, that is a faxed copy.

no record of receiving a copy.

I have

Doesn't that seem kind of

strange to you?
A

No, it don't.

Q

Regarding this information that I requested that

you supply me with and you agreed to in your deposition.
Isn't it true I requested this information?
THE COURT:

Mr. Tavlor. where are you

going with this line of Questioning?
MR. TAYLOR:

I think Mr. Yates is purpose

ly holding back information to defraud me. to cost me money,
And that's where I'mi going from.
THE COURT:

You think'he sold the prop-

111

